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The question of which physical systems compute is of pressing foundational import 
for the cognitive sciences in light of repeated claims that intelligence, cognition, or 
even consciousness reduce to, or supervene on, computational properties.  
Traditional philosophical approaches to this question have begun from the 
mathematical theory of computation, seeking a formal relationship between its 
abstract models, such as Turing machines, and physical systems.  In contrast, 
Gualtiero Piccinini’s Physical Computation develops a sustained answer grounded in 
the practices of computer science, in particular the details of computer hardware 
and architecture.  The thoroughness with which Piccinini presents his view and the 
insight it brings to longstanding debates establish it as a gold standard against 
which future theories of concrete computation will be assayed. 
 Physical Computation comprises sixteen chapters, which divide thematically 
into three main topics: Chapters 1 through 4 establish the success conditions for an 
adequate theory of physical computation and demonstrate that previous accounts 
in the literature fail to satisfy them.  Chapters 5 through 7 articulate Piccinini’s 
positive theory, developing a teleological account of mechanistic explanation that 
culminates in a statement of the characteristic functional features of computational 
mechanisms.  The remaining chapters, almost half the total length, apply this 
theory to a variety of examples and debates.  While fourteen of the chapters draw 
on separately published work, there is much added value in the presentation of this 
material as an integrated whole, as it reveals the nuance and richness of a 
comprehensive view not fully accessible through its piecemeal precursors.   
 Piccinini’s welcome decision to begin with an explicit discussion of the 
success conditions for his project serves both as orientation to his prior 
commitments and as touchstone for subsequent discussion.  From the start, the 
guiding role of computer science is on display, for instance in the requirements that 
an adequate theory of physical computation be objective, explanatory, and able to 
successfully differentiate those systems that compute from those that do not.  For 
Piccinini, the very existence of a science of computing rules out anti-realist views 
on which whether or not a system computes is a mere matter of perspective—
desktops compute and rocks do not, and any account that cannot make this 
distinction (as early isomorphism-based accounts could not) is inconsistent with 
scientific practice (11, 34).  Likewise, Piccinini takes semantic accounts, on which 
computation presupposes representation, to run afoul of the computer scientist’s 
ability to build a computer that manipulates symbols arbitrarily and without 
semantic interpretation (35).  He further requires that an adequate account explain 
(the possibility of) miscomputation, as well as correctly recover the technical 
taxonomy of types of computation (11–15). 
 Piccinini’s positive account of mechanistic computation is embedded within 
a theory of teleological mechanisms developed in conjunction with Carl Craver and 
Corey Maley (Chapters 5 and 6).  Chapter 5 rejects the autonomy of top-down 
functional analysis, arguing it should be construed as a means to “mechanism 
sketches” that must cohere with bottom-up investigation (75); consequently, 
functional analysis that does not identify its subcomponents with “structural” (read: 
physical, 80) entities is not properly explanatory.  Chapter 6 develops a teleological 
alternative to etiological accounts of mechanism function.  Identifying properties 
with causal powers (105), Piccinini singles out two “special” properties distinctive of 
organisms: homeostatic preservation, or survival, and inclusive fitness, noting they 
both require the expenditure of energy.  He then defines an objective goal as “that 
state toward which such a special property manifestation is directed, and which 
requires work on the part of the organism via particular mechanisms” (106); 
subjective goals are those “due to sentience or sapience” (116).  A teleological function is 
then a “stable contribution” by some trait or artifact to an objective or subjective 
goal (108, 116).  
 With these preliminaries in place, a physical computing system may be 
defined as a mechanism with the teleological function of computing (121).  
Nevertheless, the success of this account does not turn primarily on the details of 
the teleological theory that precedes it; rather, the real work is in the notion of 
computation on offer: 
 
Generic Computation: the processing of vehicles by a functional 
mechanism according to rules that are sensitive solely to differences 
between different portions (i.e., spatiotemporal parts) of the vehicles. 
 
Rule: a mapping from inputs I (and possibly internal states S) to outputs O. 
(121) 
 
This is essentially an elaboration of a syntax-based account of computation (44–7) 
that (a) abandons the constraint that syntactic relations exhibit the recursive 
structure found in language (46), and (b) replaces it with the requirement that the 
relevant relations be medium independent, that is, “can be defined independently of 
the media that implement them” (122).  The demand for medium independence 
does crucial work, establishing multiple realizability (122–3), while ruling out 
putative counterexamples to non-semantic accounts, namely non-computational 
input-output systems (e.g. digestive tracts (146) or mouse traps (153)). 
 The remainder of the book demonstrates the power of this theory for 
resolving or clarifying muddled disputes about putative computational systems in 
nature.  I’ll briefly illustrate this power with two examples before returning to the 
notion of medium independence and its implications for a semantics-free account 
of computation. 
 Chapter 13 nicely dissolves many of the debates surrounding the 
relationship between neural networks and classical computation.  For instance, a 
point of contention in this literature has been the claim that neural networks, and 
thus plausibly the brain, perform “massively parallel” computations—if they do, 
does this substantively challenge classical conceptions of computational 
explanation in psychology?  Piccinini helpfully distinguishes the claim that “more 
than one computational operation” occurs within a specified time frame from the 
claim that “more than one instruction” is executed (215–6).  The careful elucidation 
of computer architecture in the previous chapters reveals how standard digital 
computers are parallel in the first sense: typically, many Boolean circuits are 
operational at the same time, and in fact the syncing of these operations through a 
centralized clock is an essential feature of modern computer architecture (159–60, 
169–72).  Conversely, it is not clear that neural networks themselves perform 
parallel computations in the second sense.  Piccinini argues that neural networks 
do not in general “execute” programs, since they do not structurally instantiate the 
sequence of steps that define a program (210–1); insofar as a (typical) neural 
network instantiates a computational process, it does so serially, as it directly 
transforms a single input into a single output (211, 216).  Consequently, the issue of 
parallelism is a red herring; rather, the key question at stake is whether 
computation in the brain exhibits non-classical features such as trainability or 
continuous dynamics (219–21, 223–4). 
 Piccinini’s final topic is the “Physical Church-Turing Thesis,” the claim that 
all physical computational systems are Turing-equivalent, i.e. compute at best the 
same class of functions computable by Turing machines.  Traditionally, the PCT 
has been important as a question about the limitations of minds and the devices we 
build to aid them.  More recently, some physicists have proposed that fundamental 
physical processes are computational, and thus the universe itself performs 
computations.  However, success at computationally modeling a system does not 
necessarily imply it is best explained as performing computations (23, 69–71).  If we 
are to assess whether a computational explanation is appropriate, we need a 
physical analog to the mathematical notion of an “effective procedure” that 
motivated Church and Turing themselves.  Piccinini proposes a 
 
Usability Constraint: If a physical process is a computation, it can be used 
by a finite observer to obtain the desired values of a function. (250) 
 
This constraint allows us to helpfully generalize (again) from the details of actual 
computers to other systems, now asking not how they are structured, but rather 
how one may interact with them.  Claims that the universe as a whole, randomized 
processes (260–1), or systems involving arbitrarily precise values (259, 271) compute 
are quickly ruled out by this constraint—no finite user can exploit them for 
performing computations because she cannot reliably initialize them, repeat her 
calculations, or effectively measure their input and output values (251–5).  The 
usability constraint also rules out specific suggestions for physical super-Turing 
computers, such as Hogarth’s relativistic computer (266–70) or Siegelmann’s analog 
networks (271). 
 I want to conclude by raising a worry for Piccinini’s project and suggest a 
possible avenue for response.  My concern is that the thoroughly non-semantic 
view Piccinini defends does not have the resources to fully resolve the questions 
about human cognition that motivated his investigation in the first place.  We can 
see the shadow of this worry already in the usability response to the PCT.  One 
reason we care about whether there are super-Turing computations in nature is 
because we want to know whether the brain, and thus human cognition itself, 
might be super-Turing.  This is not a question that can be resolved by appealing to 
a prior notion of a finite user, since it concerns the very nature of paradigmatic 
users themselves.  In this case, I think the solution is straightforward: Piccinini’s 
decomposition of the usability constraint into sub-demands for initializability, 
repeatability, and measurability of input–output values can, I think, be applied to 
cognitive processes without fear of circularity.  Nevertheless, there are other 
questions for which the fix is not so easy. 
 Consider, for instance, the Sieve Problem that Haugeland (1980) raises against 
Fodor’s flirtation with the idea that psychological explanation should be purely 
syntactic.  Haugeland points out that one cannot reduce computation to rule 
governed interactions determined solely by “local syntactic properties,” since then 
even the sorting of grains by a sieve counts as computational.  In responding to 
similar examples, Piccinini appeals to the requirement that computation must 
respond differentially to medium independent features of inputs, i.e. differences 
between “spatiotemporal parts” only along some “specific dimensions of variance” 
(122, 176–7).  For instance, the stomach, while instantiating an input–output function 
from foodstuffs to their chemical constituents, does so in a way inherently tied to 
the chemical composition of the media it processes (146–7).  But a sieve responds 
only to some dimensions of spatiotemporal variance (lengths or volumes) and not 
others (the chemical composition of sorted granules), its abstract rule to sort by 
magnitude may be instantiated in different devices (e.g. a centrifuge), and different 
media (prisms sort light by magnitude of wavelength).  About the sieve problem in 
particular (176), Piccinini’s implicit argument is that a sieve does not exhibit the 
right kind of complexity to be understood as a digital computer (177f).  But mere 
sorting of magnitudes is not intuitively even a generic computational process, and if 
he embraced it as such, Piccinini would seem to violate his own requirement that 
his theory successfully differentiates those systems that compute from those that do 
not. 
 One response to these worries is to accept a tempered role for semantics in 
defining computation.  Ironically, despite Piccinini’s protest that semantics is 
irrelevant for individuating computations (31–44), his positive theory is suffused 
with semantic language.  For instance, he requires that computations be defined 
over “vehicles” (121), a term motivated by semantic considerations, namely the need 
to distinguish content from its bearer, or vehicle.  He is forced to use this term, rather 
than appealing to bare physical parts of a computational mechanism, precisely 
because computational properties are determined at an abstract, medium-
independent level.  Yet this abstract characterization of computational vehicles and 
the rules that manipulate them itself constitutes a kind of semantics, a point 
Piccinini himself develops at length as “internal semantics” (135–6, 173–5) and 
explicitly requires as part of his usability constraint (definability, 252).  The most his 
earlier arguments against semantic approaches actually show is that the 
assignment of physical, external referents is irrelevant to computation, not that 
computation may be characterized without appeal to any semantic concepts.  This 
conclusion should be unsurprising since the mathematical theory of computation 
constitutively appeals to representations, namely of abstract objects (numbers and 
functions over them), and computer scientists themselves traffic primarily in 
semantic objects, namely programming languages.  My suggestion is that Piccinini 
embrace the software side of computer science as enthusiastically as he has 
embraced the hardware, allowing a more modest role for semantics in 
characterizing computation, one not prey to the objections he legitimately levels 
against earlier approaches, but that has the resources to avoid sieve problems and 
speak more directly to questions about the computational nature of cognition itself. 
 While the question at stake here is major, the room for maneuvering against 
Piccinini is slight, so comprehensive is his articulation and defense of the 
mechanistic account.  This rigor of detail and breadth of application establish 
Physical Computation as essential reading for all those working on philosophy of 
computation, and recommend it strongly to philosophers of mind, physics, biology, 
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